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by Florian Bodoky
Intelligence Service Act: the intelligence service’s remit is set to be expanded
30/1/2026
Translation: Natalie McKay
More powers for the intelligence service: the Swiss Federal Council wants to extend FIS surveillance, but is coming up against resistance.
The Swiss Federal Council has drafted a bill that’s likely to lead to heated discussions in the Swiss Parliament over the next few months. It’s a revision of the Intelligence Service Act (IntelSA). The aim of this revision (linked page in German) is to give the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) additional technical and legal instruments for surveillance. The intention behind this is to identify violent extremism and other threats to internal and external security sooner. While supporters see this as a necessary response to new threats, critics warn against an expansion of state surveillance.
What’s being changed?
Specifically, the Swiss Federal Council is planning several amendments (linked document in German). In future, the FIS is to have the authority to resort to particularly drastic surveillance measures in cases of «violent extremism» (referred to as «measures requiring authorisation»). Until now, these were mostly only permitted in cases of terrorism. This includes, for example, monitoring communication, accessing computer systems and collecting personal data. Although these activities will still require the approval of a court, they could go very far technically (e.g. GPS-based tracking, or hacking into computer systems). They could also affect areas of life that have no reason to be under surveillance, such as private communication, leisure time or everyday working life.
Another focus is on the digital realm. The monitoring and analysis of activities in computer networks, on servers or via digital communication services are to be explicitly regulated by this act. This would clearly extend the legal mandate of the FIS to those areas in which a large proportion of communication, business and political opinion-forming takes place today. Critical infrastructure, but also social networks and other online services, could come under greater scrutiny.
At the same time, the Swiss Federal Council is proposing measures to improve control over the intelligence service. Supervision of the FIS is to be brought together in a new, independent authority dedicated specifically to this purpose. What’s more, people affected by FIS operations will, in future, have the opportunity to challenge these decisions before the Federal Administrative Court. The handling of sensitive data is also to be aligned more closely with current data protection legalisation to establish clearer rules for storage, use and disclosure.
One particularly controversial provision is no longer part of the current bill: surveillance measures against persons with a duty of professional confidentiality – such as lawyers, doctors or media professionals – are not to be permitted for the time being. This point was widely criticised in the 2022 consultation (linked page in German), leading it to be removed from the draft.
Criticism: what’s considered «violent extremism»?
Despite these amendments, serious concerns remain. A central criticism concerns the term «violent extremism» – measures requiring authorisation are also to be permitted in the fight against this. Organisations such as the Digitale Gesellschaft (Digital Society in English) (linked page in German) criticise that this term isn’t defined clearly enough in the law, potentially opening up vast leeway for interpretation. They fear that not only clearly violent groups could be targeted, but also people or movements that are politically active or express critical views. Instruments such as cable and radio communications intelligence are particularly controversial. The FIS can use these methods to record and analyse cross-border communication. As a large proportion of communication now takes place over the internet, this has the potential to impact a huge number of calls, messages and data links. Critical voices believe there’s a risk this practice will be further expanded and permanently protected by the revision of the law. They warn this could develop into a form of surveillance that’s no longer limited to specific suspected cases, but affects large sections of the population.
Other planned measures are also causing unease. These include, for example, covertly entering rooms or locating specific individuals. Judicial approval is to be required for these interventions too. Nevertheless, there’s criticism that the legal requirements for this are not specific enough, with terms such as «serious security-relevant information» allegedly leaving too much leeway. From the critics’ point of view, there’s still a risk that uninvolved persons could also be affected. There are also worries about a chilling effect, which is when people change their behaviour because they feel like they’re under surveillance. They may refrain from taking part in demonstrations, getting involved in politics or discussing controversial topics online for fear of coming under the scrutiny of state authorities.
Even greater powers despite proven abuse?
These concerns are based on past experience. The Federal Administrative Court concluded in December that the intelligence service had acted unconstitutionally in its cable and radio communications intelligence over an extended period of time. In particular, the fact that large volumes of international communication were recorded without sufficient cause was criticised. For opponents, this ruling is an important warning sign: they question whether additional powers actually lead to greater security, or whether they increase the risk of further violations of fundamental rights – despite the planned merger of the Independent Supervisory Authority for Radio Communications Intelligence (ISA) and the Independent Oversight Authority for Intelligence Activities (OA-IA).
How did this revision come about?
Discussions about the powers of the intelligence service are nothing new in Switzerland. The current Intelligence Service Act came into force in 2017 (linked page in German) and was already highly controversial at the time. The question of how the state can respond to new threats without disproportionately restricting fundamental rights was already at the centre of the discussions when it was introduced. For example, cases where violence or security-related activities could not be clearly classified as terrorism came to the fore at demonstrations. At the same time, there were further (partial) revisions relating to surveillance, such as surveillance of postal and telecommunications traffic. These aimed to include new digital communication services to a greater extent. For data protection advocates, this reinforced the impression of a gradual expansion of state surveillance capabilities. The aforementioned ruling on cable and radio communications intelligence also made it clear that existing practices were legally problematic. This is probably one of the reasons why the regulations on these issues are now set to be revised.
So what happens now?
The revision’s to be carried out in three stages. The proposals for this have been submitted to Parliament. This is where the individual provisions will be discussed, amended or possibly watered down. Supporters emphasise that the state must respond to modern threats such as cyber attacks, espionage or new forms of political violence. Opponents demand clear boundaries, greater transparency and stronger protection of fundamental rights. Last Wednesday, the Swiss Federal Council passed the basic package and submitted it for parliamentary discussion. The consultation period for the second part, which includes measures against cyber threats, is due to begin in summer 2026. The third package deals with the legal framework for radio and cable communications intelligence, which, according to the FAC, is in violation of fundamental rights. The legislator has a period of five years to rectify these issues.
Header image: Keystone-SDA / ANTHONY ANEX
I've been tinkering with digital networks ever since I found out how to activate both telephone channels on the ISDN card for greater bandwidth. As for the analogue variety, I've been doing that since I learned to talk. Though Winterthur is my adoptive home city, my heart still bleeds red and blue.
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